This paper determines when a debt contract will be monitored by lenders. This is the choice between borrowing directly (issuing a bond, without monitoring) and borrowing through a bank that monitors to alleviate moral hazard. This provides a theory of bank loan demand and of the role of monitoring in circumstances in which reputation effects are important. A key result is that borrowers with credit ratings toward the middle of the spectrum rely on bank loans, and in periods of high interest rates or low future profitability, higher-rated borrowers choose to borrow from banks.
provides a theory of individual and aggregate bank loan demand. More generally, the model explores the role of monitoring of selfinterested actions to deal with moral hazard in circumstances in which reputation effects are important. Monitoring of actions interacts with reputation (long-lived information about an agent's type).
There is a "life cycle" effect in the use of borrowing through intermediaries. New borrowers borrow from banks initially but may later issue debt directly, without using an intermediary. A borrower's credit record acquired when monitored by a bank serves to predict future actions of the borrower when not monitored.
To focus on the interaction of borrower reputation and monitoring, the model abstracts from long-term contracting and lender reputation. The only intertemporal linkage is the information in a borrower's track record. Borrowers want to borrow repeatedly, and they take into account the effects of future information generated by their actions. This role for reputation is similar to that in Kreps and Wilson (1982) and Milgrom and Roberts (1982) .
Directly placed debt (commercial paper) is a contract with terms (covenants) and loan-granting decisions that depend only on public information (including the borrower's track record).' The contract I call a bank loan uses this information plus information from costly monitoring of a borrower's actions to condition the decision to grant a loan or to condition the loan's covenants. A justification for this interpretation is that monitoring of private information is most efficiently delegated to a financial intermediary rather than collected directly by many investors (see Diamond 1984) . The contract structure to provide incentives for the financial intermediary to do this monitoring is not present, but costs generated by such a structure (and other costs, such as reserve requirements) are consistent with the setup.
A key result is that borrowers with credit ratings toward the middle of the spectrum rely on bank loans. Reputation effects eliminate the need for monitoring when the value of future profits lost because of the information revealed by defaulting on debt is large. Borrowers with higher credit ratings have a lower cost of capital, and such a rating needs to be maintained to retain this source of higher present value of future profits. These high-rated borrowers do not need monitoring. Very low rated borrowers have less to lose if they reveal bad news about themselves by defaulting, but also less to lose if they reveal bad news about themselves by being caught when monitored. As a result, monitoring will not provide incentives for these very low rated borrowers; instead monitoring will serve to screen out some borrowers who are caught taking self-interested actions. Monitoring that only screens borrowers is less useful, and it may not be worth its cost for these lower-rated borrowers.
The model has the following additional implications.
(1) The demand for monitoring is higher during periods of high interest rates or lower future economywide profitability because higher-rated borrowers then need monitoring: this implies a higher fraction of bank loans to commercial paper issues than when rates are lower. (2) The need for monitoring by higher-rated borrowers when real rates are high or future profits are low makes the quality of the average new loan made during such periods increase (default probability decrease) if moral hazard is sufficiently widespread. This makes the rates charged on average new bank loans increase less than one for one with real riskless market rates. (3) The initial periods of a borrower's reputation will typically be acquired by repaying loans from a bank that monitors, but a good track record from this monitored borrowing will allow the borrower to issue debt directly without monitoring. (4) Monitoring of new, low-rated borrowers will not provide them with incentives to avoid such actions. Many new borrowers will be turned down for credit because monitoring does not provide incentives for cooperative actions but will instead act as a screening device.
The balance of the paper proceeds as follows. Sections II-IV analyze the basic model. Section V describes the time series of choices of type of borrowing (monitored vs. direct) and type of project (safe vs. risky). Section VI, which is a bit technical, analyzes an alternative monitoring cost structure and shows that the results are very similar to those in the balance of the paper. Section VII discusses implications about determinants of bank loan demand, and Section VIII concludes the paper.
II. The Basic Model of Reputation without Monitoring
All borrowers and lenders are risk neutral. Each lender receives an endowment of inputs at the beginning of a period, and borrowers receive no endowment. Borrowers and lenders have access to a constant returns to scale technology for storing endowment within a period, converting it to a perishable consumption good that must be consumed at the end of a period. This technology returns R units of output at the end of a period per unit of input at the beginning of the period. Each period, borrowers face a new set of lenders that live for a single period. Because borrowers must borrow endowment and offer an expected return of at least R, they never use the storage technology. There are three sorts of projects, and the set of projects available to each borrower is the borrower's private information. Projects are in short supply (they do not exhaust any period's endowment), implying that storage is always in use, and a borrower can borrow by offering lenders an expected return of R. There are three types of borrowers:
Type G: Borrowers that have one safe, positive net present value project each period. They can invest one (dollar) and receive G > R at the end of the period. Type B: Borrowers that have one risky, negative net present value project each period. They can invest one, and with probability 'r < 1, the project returns B (where riB < R and B > G); with probability 1 -g, it returns zero.
Type BG: Borrowers that have their choice each period of an action, denoted by a,, between either one of two mutually exclusive projects. By taking action a, = g, they select a safe project in period t that is identical to that of type G's; by taking action at = b, they select a risky project in period t that is identical to that of type B's.
The initial population of borrowers contains a proportion fG of type G's, fB of type B's, andfBG of type BG's. The proportions are public information. A borrower's type, action, and the realized output of his project are private information observed only by the borrower. At periods other than t = 1, there will be a track record, Qt. of each borrower that will condition lenders' beliefs about type. The track record of a borrower consists of the dates on which the borrower repaid the face value of debt, defaulted on debt, and the outcome of all past monitoring of the borrower. To rule out certain "moneyburning" equilibria (which I could rule out on other grounds) that involve borrowers that pay unnecessarily high interest rates, assume that the face value of debt offered in the past is not part of the track record. The probability or proportion of each type 0 of borrower at the beginning of period t in the group of borrowers with track record Qt. P(0 Ill,), is denoted by f ". I use f?' with no explicit Qt, to denote the type probabilities given a "perfect" track record at date t: never a default or an instance of being caught taking risky projects when monitored.
Borrowers offer debt contracts to lenders. Because I assume that cash flows from projects are not observed (and that consumption cannot be negative), no other contract form dominates the debt contract. To explain why the debt contracts are enforceable, make the following assumption. There is a liquidation technology, use of which can be included as a contingency in financial contracts. One interpretation of liquidation is a highly inefficient bankruptcy court. Projects have a zero liquidation value at the end of a period, but liquidation destroys all profits from a project, including those that the borrower does not pay to lenders, preventing the borrower from consuming them. This implies that lenders and borrowers each receive zero when there is liquidation. Liquidation does not destroy the borrower's ability to invest in the future and induces no other pain for the borrower. The threat of liquidation implies that borrowers will pay the face value of debt whenever their projects deliver sufficient return. Liquidation produces no information about the project's return (in contrast to the costly state verification in Townsend [1979] ), but in equilibrium there is liquidation only when the value of the project's cash flow is zero.
There are T time periods, where T < oc, but I use limiting behavior as T --oo for most results. Finite T allows use of backward induction arguments and of results from finitely repeated game theory in the selection of equilibria. There may be additional equilibria if T is infinite, but I have not analyzed these. The future is discounted: the present value of a unit of consumption at the end of a period is d' 1.
Borrowers with a given track record offer lenders the lowest face value each period that offers lenders an expected return of R, net of monitoring costs. The proof of lemma 1 below shows why this is reasonable. The idea is as follows. At the final date, T, a borrower would offer a face value higher than this minimum only if there was a reduced probability of receiving a loan at the lower face value, that is, only if lenders draw inferences from lower rates that lead to a reduced probability that the loan will be granted. It is a sequential equilibrium for all borrowers to offer the lowest face value that gives lenders a net expected return of R, supported by lenders' beliefs that borrower type is not a function of the face value rT offered. This equilibrium is reasonable (satisfies the usual refinements of sequential equilibrium) because borrowers with risky projects (to whom lenders would not knowingly lend) have a smaller benefit from paying a lower rate because they pay the rate with probability ar < 1; those with a safe project pay the rate for sure. If anything, the action that could indicate that one was not worth lending to (and has a stigma) would be to offer a higher rate. It is a dominated strategy for type G's to offer a higher rate given that they receive funding for sure at the lower rate, because they then pay more than necessary for the same financing: there is no lender response to the higher rate that would make type G's choose to offer a high rate of interest.
The offering of the lowest possible rate of interest holds for all dates t because past interest rate offers are not part of the track record. As a result, there is no benefit of influencing future lenders' beliefs from overpaying interest. If all other borrowers are offering the lowest rate, then a deviant would increase the current cost of borrowing and have no effect on the future costs. The assumption of unobservable face value offers is not necessary: the identical outcomes are generated by observable rates and the belief that the rate offered is independent of type. LEMMA 1. On each date all borrowers offer the lowest face value that provides lenders a net expected return of R.
Proof. See the Appendix. Let rt be the face value of a debt contract in period t. The amount loaned to all borrowers at the beginning of a period is one unit, the scale of each project. The debt contract specifies liquidation if a borrower pays less than rt and no liquidation if he pays rt.
III. Project Choice without Monitoring
This section introduces the incentive problem faced by type BG borrowers, initially assuming that monitored lending (such as a bank loan) is not available.
At the final period, t = T, unmonitored type BG borrowers will select risky projects if and only if the expected end-of-period payoff from selecting risky projects, rr(B -rT), exceeds the payoff from safe projects, G -rT. Safe projects are selected if and only if the face value rT is low enough: rT < (G -arB)/(1 -ar) AT. The face value of the debt is a decreasing function of the borrower's credit rating because it must contain a default premium. Higher-rated borrowers have lower face values rT and are thus less subject to the moral hazard.
I assume that even at the riskless rate of interest, rT = R, type BG borrowers with a single-period horizon would select risky projects, implying that AT> R. Reputation effects of multiple borrowing opportunities are then important to provide incentives to select the proper project. Because type BG and type B borrowers will select risky projects at the final date T, no one will lend without monitoring at date T unless borrowers have a sufficiently high probability of being type G, given their track record. Because type G borrowers do not default, this implies that without monitoring, a single default results in a cutoff of credit because successively earlier periods become the "last" opportunity to borrow. Repaying a loan at a date before T has the short-run cost of rt minus the long-run benefit of the rents from borrowing in the future from dates t + 1 to T. Let Vt+1 denote the value to a type BG of borrowing making optimal project decisions over these dates. The payoff from choosing a safe project at t is G -rt + Vt+ 1; the payoff from choosing a risky project is mr(B -rt + Vt+ ), implying that safe projects are selected if and only if rt < AT + V,+ 1 At. The reputation capital that is lost on a default is VT+ ,. The present value of future rents, V+ 1, is increasing in the credit rating (e.g., in 1 -fBt). This implies that a sufficiently good credit rating, as well as a long horizon, is required for there to be incentives to choose safe projects (see Diamond 1989 For a fixed cost, a period t lender can monitor the random variable ?ht that might catch a borrower choosing the risky project. With probability 1 -P, such monitoring produces an "uninformative" report, Mt= 0, on the borrower, independent of the action or type of the borrower. With probability P, monitoring will detect the choice of risky projects (action at = b, selected by a type BG) without error, delivering the report mt = b. If the borrower did not take an action to select risky projects (because he was type B or G, or if safe projects are selected by a type BG), the monitoring delivers the "uninformative" report mt = 0.
If the borrower is a type B or G or is a type BG choosing safe projects, monitoring delivers the realization mt = 0 for sure (because the action at = b is not taken by these types). The distribution of ?ht given a type BG borrower who has selected risky projects, at = b, is Mt = b with probability P and mt = 0 with probability 1 -P.
The cost of monitoring in date 2 units is C -0. The action of monitoring by the lender is observed by the borrower, and the commitment to monitor can be made before the borrowers choose their actions. The ability to commit to monitoring is important because it can provide incentives that remove the uncertainty about the action monitored. Note that the cost C can include costs of providing incentives to delegate the monitoring to a bank (see Diamond 1984) and costs of being a bank, such as reserve requirements and operating costs. Because loan size is a constant, fixed and variable monitoring costs are not distinguished.
There are two specifications of the timing of monitoring that turn out to provide the same incentives to borrowers, and each has some claim to being realistic. The first assumes that lenders monitor actions before a loan is granted but incur the costs even if it is not granted. The second assumes that the loan must be granted and production undertaken before it is possible to observe actions, but that the lender can enforce a loan covenant allowing early liquidation contingent on the outcome of the monitoring. Results below are stated for the case of monitoring before loan origination, and they are identical to those of the second case if the early liquidation yields the initial capital lent.2
The timing of the moves and the arrival of information from monitoring when monitoring comes before loans are advanced are shown in the first time line in figure 1 (time goes left to right). Borrowers offer a contract, lenders begin to monitor, type BG borrowers choose an action, and on the basis of the monitoring of the action, the lender decides whether to grant the loan. If a, = b is detected, no loan is made. If a loan is made, the borrower then observes the project's outcome and makes a repayment, with liquidation if the payment is less than face value.
The equivalent alternative structure is shown in the second time line in figure 1. In this case, each borrower chooses an interest rate to offer to lenders. The lenders then decide whether to accept the offer and advance capital and whether to monitor. If the loan is granted, the borrower invests the capital; if he is a type BG, he chooses an action, at. Lenders that choose to monitor then observe mt.3 The lender includes a loan covenant providing the right to liquidate early if risky projects are detected, mt = b. This early liquidation yields the lender the present value of the one dollar loaned and yields 2 If liquidation yields less than 100 percent of the present value of initial capital, the value for C for which lenders will monitor is reduced. Being caught still reduces the borrower's return to zero in the current period.
3 The reason the alternative technology provides identical incentives is that the optimal covenant sets the face value of debt to B when mt = b is observed and provides a zero return to a borrower caught with a, = b. This is identical to the borrower's return if no loan is granted. The current-period effects of monitoring on a borrower's payoff are identical in the two cases. Given a face value rt selected by a borrower, a lender decides whether to monitor on the basis of maximizing expected return net of monitoring costs. A lender will monitor in period t if and only if monitoring is profitable and monitored lending is feasible: the first requires that the increase in expected return from monitoring is at least the monitoring cost, C, and the second requires that the monitored loan offers an expected return of at least R + C. Lenders lend for a single period: their monitoring decision depends on the one-period expected profit.
Monitoring has no direct effect on borrowers that are not of type BG. It can serve one of two functions: incentives or screening. Monitoring provides incentives if it induces type BG borrowers to select safe projects. It screens if it does not provide incentives but instead catches some type BG's choosing risky projects (allowing the loan not to be made). The value of monitoring to the lender is greater when it provides incentives. When it does provide incentives, it increases the probability of receiving the face value rt (which exceeds R) from ,r to one when the borrower is a type BG (increases the expected payment from -rrt to rt). A borrower with a perfect track record is a type BG with probability fBGt, implying that the lender's expected return from investing C in monitoring that provides incentives is fBGt(l -ar)rt. The effect of screening a BG is to allow the capital to be invested elsewhere at an expected return of R, and this increases the expected payment from 'rrt to R. The expected return from investing C in monitoring that screens iSfBGtP(R -art), which is strictly less than when monitoring provides incentives because P ' 1 and rt > R.
Lenders will not monitor if there is no moral hazard (type BG borrowers select safe projects without monitoring) because neither their actions of granting loans conditioned on the outcome nor the borrowers' actions are affected by monitoring. One necessary condition for monitoring to be used is that monitoring is needed.
A. Actions and Monitoring
In any period in which a borrower is caught choosing risky projects, no one will advance a loan because it would be a negative net present value investment. The borrower's return that period is zero. Selecting risky projects, at = b, when monitored implies a probability 1 -P of receiving a loan that period; selecting safe projects, at = g, implies a loan for sure. There may also be an effect on future treatment by lenders. The next subsection examines the last period, T, where this second effect is absent. Monitoring reduces the probability of receiving B -rT when aT = b from -r to ar(l -P). If P = 1, monitoring will provide incentives at T. Because the face value with monitoring must be at least R + C, a necessary condition for monitoring to provide incentives at T is
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P ? 1 -[(G -R -C)/(B -R -C)].
B. Monitoring and Reputation
Assume that without some reputation effects, monitoring cannot induce type BG borrowers to select safe projects. The other case, which is more complicated but produces similar results, is discussed in Section VI. Even if borrowing at the riskless rate that covers monitoring costs (a face value of R + C), type BG borrowers will select risky projects if monitored (both AT< R and IT < R + C). Because only type G borrowers would select safe projects at date T, lenders will lend only to borrowers with a sufficiently large probability of being a type G.' Borrowers that default at any date or are caught selecting risky projects (and reveal that they are not type G) have their credit permanently cut off. If no one will lend to them at the last period, backward induction implies that each earlier period is the "last" period. Only a borrower with a perfect record of never defaulting or being caught when monitored can borrow on a given date. All borrowers that are caught when monitored are revealed to be type BG, and a fraction -r of the remaining types B and BG (if a, = b) default each period.
The Decision of a Type BG, with Monitoring
Let V, I denote the present value of rents of a type BG that makes optimal decisions from t + 1 to T given a record up to date t of never defaulting or being caught when monitored. The future value of all other track records is zero. If a risky project is selected, the borrower is caught with probability P, and he cannot borrow in the current period or in any future period: the payoff is zero. With probability 1 -P, monitoring is uninformative, and mt = 0. Conditional on mt = 0, the borrower has a probability of repayment of -r Figure 2 shows the regions of monitoring and credit granting at date T, for a particular set of parameters. The way to interpret it is to view 1 -fB as the borrower's credit rating and fBG as the pervasiveness of moral hazard in the population of borrowers. Holding fixed a value of fBG and changingfB give the effect of a credit rating on the type of borrowing chosen or, alternatively, on the ability to borrow at all.
The use of monitored bank lending as a function of the credit rating of the borrower is as follows. For a sufficiently high credit If monitoring is sufficiently costly, high-rated borrowers will borrow directly (without monitoring), and low-rated borrowers may not be monitored unless they have a good enough rating for monitoring to provide incentives. Many implications of the model, discussed in Section VII, follow from this characterization of the value and use of monitoring as a function of the current credit rating. The dynamics of the time series of action choices by borrowers and lenders are more complicated but are also useful in understanding decisions over a life cycle of a borrower. These are described in Sections V and VI.
V. Equilibrium Path of Actions
As time passes, a borrower's track record and credit rating change. The more times a borrower continues a perfect track record (has borrowed and repaid in full and been monitored and not been caught), the higher conditional probability of being a type G because the number of type G's with a perfect record stays constant and the number of type B's with a perfect record declines; the number of type BG's with a perfect record either declines (if risky projects are selected) or stays constant (if safe projects are selected). The probability of being a type BG, given a perfect record, increases at date t + 1 if safe projects are selected (because then all type BG's continue a perfect record and only some type B's do not) and falls if risky projects are selected (because then at least as many BG's lose the perfect record as type B's). A fraction aT of type BG's continue a perfect record if they choose risky projects and there is no monitoring; if they choose risky projects and are monitored, a fraction IT(l -P) continue a perfect record.
Let Nb denote one plus the number of past periods in which BG's selected risky projects and NS one plus the number of past periods in which there was monitoring that screened (NS ? Nb because screening requires a choice of risky projects). The number of type BG's with a perfect track record, as a fraction of the initial date 1 number of borrowers of all types, is therefore fBG'TNb-l (1 -p)Ns-1. Finally, the probability of being a type B given a continuation of a perfect record falls if there is no screening (because the proportion of BG's that end their perfect record is less than or equal to that of type B's) but can rise if there is screening and P and fBGt are sufficiently high (because the proportional drop in BG's is much larger than the drop in B's). Some useful properties of equilibrium follow directly from these dynamics offo1 and the definition of the constraints. These are given in lemma 3. LEMMA 3. If monitored lending is feasible at t (either r1 ' G or rs ? G) if it provides incentives at t. 7. There is at most one connected set of dates on which screening is used because if screening was profitable in the past and is not now, it will not be profitable in the future. Further, if screening is profitable given rs = G and is not profitable at t = 1, it will never be profitable.
1.
Proof. The lemma is proved by substitution, using fBt+I < fBt if there is no screening at t andfBGt?l > (<)fBGt as at = g (b) and using Vt ? Vt, 1 if T -t is sufficiently large; this is proved in the Appendix.
Part 1 uses the result that rs < rs 1 if there is screening at t (proved in the Appendix). Part 2 uses the result that there is no monitoring if incentive monitoring is unprofitable. The condition in part 3 is obtained from the condition for incentive monitoring to be profitable with fBt = 0: the condition provided is sufficient because fBt+ I > 0 makes the constraint looser.
A. The Most General Possible Order of Actions
The results in lemma 3 put strong restrictions on the possible time series of actions by type BG's and monitoring choices by banks. I assume that T -> oo to avoid concern with approaching the endgame in which reputation effects break down because of a short horizon (the only discussion of the endgame is in the proof of lemma 2). To avoid repeated formal statements, I shall say that a result is true given a long horizon if it is true for all dates less that vand that ->o as T -> oo. Given a long horizon, the following are true. By part 5 of lemma 3, once monitoring is not needed, it will not be needed again (before T). By part 6, once monitoring provides incentives, it will provide incentives thereafter. As a result, if monitoring ever screens rather than provides incentives, it occurs toward the beginning of a borrower's credit history. It would not occur at the very beginning only if fB is too high for it to pay and fBt falls fast enough relative to fBGt (which is unlikely). Given these results and a long horizon, the most general possible order of actions by BG's and lenders (which occurs if each constraint has at least one period in which it is the only binding constraint) is Proposition 1 below summarizes the technological conditions that determine whether reputation effects alone or monitoring along with reputation can eventually provide incentives for safe projects (atg) to be selected at some date t, given a long horizon: the conditions at which tA < T + 1 and t1 < T + 1. These results describe what happens once a borrower has acquired a very good reputation: if there were never a period in which safe projects were selected, then for large enough t, fBt -> 0 and fBGt .> 0, which implies that r -> R and r' -> R + C. The reasoning is as follows. At dates close to T, risky projects will be selected, there will not be monitoring, and the value of maintaining a perfect track record will approach B -R per period. At any date near T on which risky projects are selected thereafter, the value of maintaining a perfect track record will ap- Proof. The conditions in parts 1-3 for reputation or monitoring not to provide incentives were established above; sufficiency of the reverse conditions for monitoring or reputation to provide incentives is proved in the Appendix. Part 4 is implied by part 3 of lemma 3 and part 5 by part 4 of lemma 3. Q.E.D.
The simplest characterization of equilibrium comes from the implications of borrowers offering the lowest face value that provides lenders a net expected return of R per period. This implies that reputation alone provides incentives on the first date that it is self-fulfilling, tA, given the current track record, f0t. Folding back from this date (unless it is date 1 or no such date exists) allows determination of the first self-fulfilling date that monitoring provides incentives, t1. Determining these two dates requires knowledge of V,,,, the value of future rents, but all other decisions in the model, such as whether monitoring that provides incentives is profitable, depend only on the current track record,f0o. Given a specified tA and t1, one can determine the values of the relevant face values in each period. Because monitoring is used only when needed, if monitoring is ever used to provide incentives, then t1 < tA. Define tg mintt, tA} as the first date on which the safe projects are selected. Given knowledge of tg, one knows that risky projects were selected each previous period, and repeatedly evaluating the conditions for screening to be profitable determines whether there was screening on previous dates. This allows the conditional type probabilities given a perfect record at tg to be calculated, and given these one can determine whether monitoring is needed at tg. If it is not needed, then tg = tA, and one knows rt = rg for all future dates. If monitoring is needed at tg, the date (if any) on which monitoring is not needed is computed from the type probabilities given from the monitoring conditions after tg and tA the smallest selffulfilling value.
A time series of face values, for an exogenously given value of tg = t', that satisfies all the requirements that monitoring be profitable, computed according to the procedure of the last paragraph is the X vector R[t'], with elements Rt[t'], and it is formally defined in the Appendix in the proof of proposition 2.
This conjectured series of face values is used to compute the present value of future rents. Whenever the rents given this face value series and the current and future choice of safe projects are sufficiently high, then safe projects are selected: by lemma 2, the minimum value of these future rents for safe projects to be selected with-
out monitoring is daT(B -G)/(1 -T) =VA, and the minimum value for projects to be selected at t with monitoring is d[rr(I -P)(B -G)]I[l -Ta(l -P)]. Given a conjectured face value series R[t'] and an arbitrarily long horizon, it is straightforward to compute the present value of always selecting a safe project. Let WV[t'] denote the present value of choosing safe projects each period from t to v -*, facing rates R[t'], given by co

WVi[t'] = (G -Rt[t']) d'+t-. t=t
The most general characterization is proposition 2. Because the face value series R[t'] is constructed to satisfy all the model's constraints, choosing the smallest self-fulfilling value of t' = tg provides the lowest self-fulfilling rt given the history up to t and is thus the equilibrium value. PROPOSITION 
The equilibrium value of t' is the smallest selffulfilling value: tg is the smallest t' such that Wt, [t'], the present value of selecting at = g and borrowing with face values given by R[t'] for each period from t' to 7, exceeds either daT(B -G)/(1 -a) VG or d [a(l -P)(B -G)]/[1 -a(I -P)] -VI. If the first condition is the one first satisfied, then t' = tg = tA, and monitoring never provides incentives; alternatively, if the second condition is first satisfied, then t' = tg = t1, and monitoring provides incentives and is used until it
If fB is high enough that monitoring is needed but does not provide incentivesfBG is high enough that screening is profitable, and a weighted sum offB andfBG is low enough that rs ? G, then there
is monitoring that screens at t = 1: tSPa = 1 and tg > 1. 4. IffB is high enough that monitoring is needed and does not provide incentives, fB + fBG is low enough that r1 ? G, and C is high enough that monitoring is unprofitable at date 1 even if it would provide incentives, then there is never monitoring and risky projects are selected at t = 1: tSPb = tip = 1.
IffB is high enough that monitoring is needed but does not provide incentives,fBG is either low enough or very high (and possibly
fB is high enough) that screening is unprofitable, and fB + fBG is low enough that rb ? G, then there is no monitoring and risky projects are selected at t = 1: tspa > 1 6. IffB is high enough that rg > GfB is high enough for monitoring to be needed and both rH > G and r4b > G and is low enough to provide incentives, or fB is high enough for monitoring to be needed but not provide incentives andfB andfBG are high enough that both rs > G and rb > G, then markets fail on all t ? T.
The proposition is proved by verification of conditions when at g without monitoring for the remainder of the horizon is selffulfilling and substitution into the monitoring constraints.
The next section describes the case in which monitoring is so precise that even without reputation it can eliminate moral hazard. This section is a bit technical and concludes that this case is qualitatively similar to the case considered above (with the exception of a single point about the reinforcement effect of reputation on monitoring). Hurried readers can skip to Section VII for a discussion of the empirical implications of the model.
VI. Cheap and Effective Monitoring
Suppose that monitoring is sufficiently precise (P close enough to one) and inexpensive (C close enough to zero) that it can provide incentives at date T (without reputation). Continue to assume that without monitoring the risky project would be taken. Borrowing at date T then requires that the probability of being a type B be low enough, and not the stronger condition that in addition the probability of type G be positive. A borrower known for sure to be a type BG would be able to borrow at T with monitoring. He would need to be monitored each period because once he is known to be a type BG, there is no more information to be revealed. Observed outcomes have no effect on future treatment by lenders, implying that a borrower's decisions always have a one-period horizon.
An interpretation of the distinction between the two cases is that they refer to the monitoring of two different types of information. This section deals with information that, once revealed, produces information that reveals only slightly embarrassing news about a borrower (compared to the best possible news about a borrower); the previous case examined more embarrassing information. There are multiple sequential equilibria in this case, but most of them are not very reasonable. The multiplicity arises because a borrower's choice of projects depends on the response of lenders to a current default, which in turn depends on what lenders believe about a borrower's unobserved choice of projects. The equilibria that I rule out have current lenders believe that type BG borrowers choose risky projects only because they believe that future lenders will expect safe projects should the future lenders lend to a borrower that defaults this period. In the Appendix I give a formal argument that the equilibrium described in this section satisfies the usual game-theoretic equilibrium refinements related to the Kolberg-Mertens (1986) notion of strategic stability. Formally, this is a proof that these refinements are satisfied in an equilibrium in which lemma 1 applies, and borrowers always offer the lowest self-fulfilling face value of debt that provides lenders a net expected return of R.
There are two types of ruled-out equilibria. One implies that no one will lend today; the other implies that required interest rates are high today, in each case because of pessimism about BG actions that can be justified only by conjectured future optimism of lenders to these borrowers after they default. Ruling these out is equivalent to assuming that a lower present value of future rents never makes borrowers more concerned about the future, that is, never more willing to choose to reduce rents this period (by selecting safe projects) to preserve their chances of collecting smaller future rents.
This implies that credit is cut off after a default in any period.5 If safe projects are selected, then the default comes from type B's (to whom no one would lend). If risky projects are selected, then the type BG borrower cannot be induced to select safe projects at t and will not be able to be induced to select safe projects at t + 1 (and therefore no one will lend at t + 1).
The equilibrium actions and beliefs are as follows. If a borrower is monitored and caught taking risky projects, then there is no loan this period and he is revealed to be a type BG. If the borrower is not caught (including not monitored), then if he defaults, he is believed to be a type B (and credit is cut off forever) unless this belief is not self-fulfilling. If it is not self-fulfilling (i.e., borrowers select risky projects even when credit cutoff is the penalty), then given a default, the inferred proportions of types are the beginning-of-period proportions, subtracting all the type G's and the type BG's that were caught if and when monitored.6
Because type BG borrowers are believed to choose safe projects in any period that this belief is self-fulfilling (and have credit cut off if they default), the condition for monitoring to be needed is as before (except for a possibly different value of V, 1, the value of borrowing in the future).
The conditions for monitoring to provide incentives differ from those in the former analysis. If monitored and caught with risky projects, the borrower will not receive a current loan and is revealed to be a type BG, implying that future loans are available. There then can be no more reputation effects once he is known to be a type BG because no further learning from outcomes can occur. This implies that monitoring will be needed every period, and the face value each period will be R + C. The present value of future rents for a borrower known to be a type BG is defined as Ut, and is given by (G -R -C)Zdl+tt-t Ut,. Monitoring will not be reinforced by reputation when the current value of maintaining a good reputation, Vt+ l, is low relative to Ut+ l, the value of being revealed to be a type BG. For a low-rated borrower who must borrow at high interest rates, it can improve the future terms at which he can borrow if revealed to be a BG: Vt+I can be less than UT+1.7 Lemma 4 provides the condition under which this "negative stigma" from being caught prevents monitoring from providing incentives.
LEMMA 4. Monitoring fails to provide incentives whenever needed 7 If eventually reputation alone can provide incentives, then once a sufficiently good reputation is acquired, monitoring will be reinforced by reputation. With a good enough reputation, a BG with a perfect track record borrows at a face value approaching R, which is better than revealing oneself to be a type BG and borrowing at R + C. Note that as C -* 0 there is a weakly negative stigma and no reinforcement by reputation. If the payoff when caught is less than this level, the probability P of being caught makes risky projects less attractive; but monitoring costs increase the face value of debt and tilt the choice toward risky projects. The increased face value due to monitoring costs is at least C, and this increased face value reduces the face value of the safe project by C and that of the risky project by Cr(1 -P). The difference between these is the second term in the inequality in lemma 4; it is divided by P because the monitoring cost must be paid for sure, but the borrower is caught (and receives the payoff U,+ ) only with probability P.
For both types of monitoring, cheap and effective and weak or expensive, the stigma from being caught (which measures the contribution of reputation to the efficacy of monitoring) is a strictly increasing function of V, 1, the value of having the reputation associated with a perfect track record of no defaults and never being caught by monitoring. The stigma is Vt+1 -{PI[1 -7r(1 -P)]}Ut+1, where Ut+1 is a constant. For effective and cheap monitoring, the constant is positive; for weak or expensive monitoring, the constant is zero. A better credit rating (higher Vt+ 1) more strongly reinforces monitoring but also makes it more likely that monitoring is not needed. Except for the fact that reputation reinforces the effect of monitoring, the two cases are the same. All the results of propositions 1-3 are true except that the reduced effect of reputation is reflected in VI =-d{[7r(1 -P)(B -G) -PUt+1]/[I -7r (1 -P)]}, where the value with Ut+ = 0 was used previously.
Information that is not tremendously embarrassing will be useful and will be reinforced by reputation effects only if the borrower's current reputation is very good. This type of information might not be monitored for borrowers with worse reputations because it would not provide incentives. For borrowers with poor enough reputations, some less precise and higher-cost information could be preferred if it had a greater stigma attached and therefore provided incentives rather than just screened borrowers.
VII. Empirical Implications about Bank Loan Demand
The model has implications about the credit ratings of those borrowers who use banks (or other monitoring intermediaries) and about the portfolios of banks (or other monitoring intermediaries). The discussion above has developed the former implications on which borrowers are included in bank loan demand, summarized in figure 2, with 1 -fBt interpreted as the credit rating: borrowers with high credit ratings will borrow directly without monitoring, lower-rated borrowers will borrow from banks and monitoring will provide incentives, and still lower-rated borrowers (if monitoring costs are not too high) will borrow from banks and will be screened; some of these will be turned down for credit. The last group might appear to receive stochastic credit rationing if one did not observe the information monitored by banks. Section VI describes the life cycle transitions of borrowers between these groups over time. The implications for the composition of bank loan portfolios come from examining the effect of changes in real interest rates or the profitability of typical investments on the cross-sectional demand for monitored bank loans. The way to interpret this is to imagine that at each date there are borrowers with many different credit ratings, possible overlapping cohorts of borrowers with different dates when they began acquiring their reputation, or borrowers for whom other public information differs. New additions to bank loan portfolios consist of the sum of all borrower credit ratings for which monitoring provides incentives and is profitable, as well as a fraction 1 -PfBGt (those who are not caught) of borrowers with those credit ratings (if any) for which screening is profitable and feasible.
The changes in conditions that I consider are changes in real riskless interest rates and a proportionate change in the payoffs of all projects, both safe and risky. For example, assume a single time period and consider proportional changes in the real riskless return on a one-unit investment: its return is now P * R. Consider project return changes such that the return on safe projects is oLG and the return on risky projects when successful is oLB (with expected return owrB). The ratio o&1 is similar to Tobin's q: future rents from investment are high when this ratio is high. Tobin's q could be used as a proxy for a/a. The condition in which monitoring is needed is IB--Ad otAT + Vt+ I
and Vt+I is decreasing in P and increasing in a. When real rates increase relative to future profitability, the future becomes less important and moral hazard becomes more severe: more credit ratings choose to take a chance on ruining their now less valuable reputation. I shall state my results in terms of changes in the present value of future rents: these increase when a falls sufficiently relative to a. Similarly, a sufficient decrease in a relative to a will imply that the minimum credit rating for which monitoring provides incentives will also increase (the maximum face value for monitoring to provide incentives is It, which behaves similarly to At). In terms of figure 2, the horizontal lines that give the boundary credit ratings such that monitoring is needed and provides incentives both shift down (requiring higher ratings). A lower present value of future rents (lower q) leads new bank loans to be less risky because borrowers with lower default risk choose to be monitored, and fewer loans are made to lower-rated borrowers because monitoring no longer provides incentives for these borrowers.' There are two reasons that fewer bank loans are made to lowrated borrowers: if screening is not profitable for the borrowers with ratings for which monitoring no longer provides incentives, these ratings no longer get new loans; if screening is profitable, a fraction 1 -PfBGt are caught and no longer receive loans. Lower q implies that banks deal on average with safer borrowers. This change in clientele implies that the loan rate charged to the average bank borrower will increase less than one for one with riskless real rates because the default risk premium of the average loan is decreasing in real riskless rates. This would generate bank loan interest rate data that make it appear that bankers are slow to adjust loan rates to changed market interest rates.
If the switch to safer lending when the present value of future profits decreases were sufficiently strong, it would generate what is referred to as a "flight to quality" or "credit crunch" that some would attribute instead to panicky bankers.
The model also has implications for the determinants of the ratio of the value of new bank loans to the value of new commercial paper issues. A decrease in future profitability that will make monitoring needed for higher-rated borrowers can lead to more new bank loans relative to new commercial paper. This presumes that the dominant effect of reduced future profitability is the increased monitoring of higher-rated borrowers, and not reduced monitoring by lower-rated borrowers due to the reduced incentive effect of monitoring.9
There is a potential problem in applying this result to U.S. data on new bank loans and commercial paper issues. Until 1986, banks faced regulatory deposit interest rate ceilings that restricted the supply of some deposits to banks, restricting bank lending in periods of high nominal interest rates. This was especially important in 1966-70, when a binding ceiling applied to large certificates of deposit as well; this period would not provide useful data. After 1970, large banks could raise funds at an unregulated interest rate using certificates of deposit of 89-day or shorter maturity, so there is a reasonable hope of measuring the changes in demand for bank loan monitoring by examining the quantities of loans relative to commercial paper issues. Including private placements that are not bank loans as monitored lending would also help reduce problems due to binding rate ceilings. In addition, in the 1980s, the identification of bank loans and other private placements as monitored and commercial paper as unmonitored has been blurred. Bank loans sold in secondary markets may involve much less monitoring, and some commercial paper is guaranteed by bank letters of credit that provide the bank strong incentives to monitor. Before 1980, these considerations are not of significant importance in U.S. banking markets.
The model has ambiguous implications about the effect of increased uncertainty about future interest rates (higher R, volatility) on the demand for monitoring today. The value of future rents, Vt+ 1, is neither always concave nor always convex in R+ l. As a result, there is no clear prediction about the effect of changes in volatility of future interest rates.
LetfA be the highestfB such that monitoring provides incentives andfA~t the lowest for which monitoring is not needed. An increase in rates, ,3, or a decrease in profitability, a, increases flt/fB' and reduces each of the two. If commercial paper data measure loans to those borrowers that do not need monitoring, the statement follows if the dollar value of loans to those with credit ratings around f' t (that no longer receive loans after ,3 increases) is not too much larger than the dollar value of loans to those with ratings around fA' (that switch to bank loans from commercial paper after IB increases).
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VIII. Conclusion
The model predicts that if moral hazard is sufficiently widespread, then new borrowers will begin their reputation acquisition by being monitored and later switch to issuing directly placed debt. The favorable track record acquired while being monitored will be useful in predicting future actions without monitoring. Reputation alone can eventually deal with the moral hazard because the better reputation achieved over time implies that adverse selection is then less severe. The clientele of borrowers who rely on monitored bank loans are the middle-rated borrowers, whose rating is too low for reputation effects to eliminate moral hazard but is high enough for monitoring to eliminate moral hazard.
Monitoring that is very effective and cheap may fail to provide incentives to eliminate moral hazard because it removes the stigma from being known to be subject to moral hazard: future monitoring can deal with the moral hazard effectively. Monitoring can then destroy its own value because reputation effects work against its effectiveness.
In periods of high present or anticipated future real interest rates or low present or future anticipated economywide profitability, a higher credit rating is required to borrow without monitoring, implying that the demand for bank loan monitoring is then high and that the average new bank loan goes to a safer, higher-rated customer.
implies a weak incentive for a borrower with a safe project to offer the higher rate, a borrower with a risky project has a strict incentive to offer the higher rate. The Banks-Sobel (1987) divinity refinement or independence of inferences that are never a weak best response (see Kolberg and Mertens 1986; Cho and Sobel 1990) allows only the interpretation that offering the higher rate indicates a risky project. The logic is that there are conjectured responses of lenders that might attract those with a risky project to the higher face when borrowers with safe projects would not be attracted, but not vice versa. Therefore, lenders conclude that the higher face indicates risky projects, they will not lend at the higher face value, and Ap < 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3
Result That rs < rs 1 with Screening at t -1
The face value rs is set such that the investment of R plus a further investment of C on screening is equal to the expected return from receiving rt with probability fG, + 7r[fBt + (1 -P)fBGt]
Ft plus a return of R (from investing in storage) with probability P *fBGt at. One period later, rt+ I is received with probability is screening at t -1, rs < rts1, and because screening is feasible at t, rt ' r'. If the actions were fixed, then for dates sufficiently far from T, Vt is increasing over time. To establish that when an action changes it leads to a rate below that implied by the action at the previous date, note that, given lenders' actions, the only borrower action change that could increase the rate above its previous-period value is a switch to at = b, which would need to imply that at = g was not self-fulfilling The only lender action change that could increase the rate is a switch to monitoring from not monitoring; however, lenders monitor only when the rate with monitoring is below the one that would prevail without monitoring, and the rate that would prevail without monitoring is less than the one that prevailed without monitoring the previous period. This establishes that r, is decreasing over time if sufficiently far from t and that any action changes weakly increase V, above the value for fixed actions, implying that V, is weakly increasing in t if sufficiently far from T. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1
The necessary conditions for monitoring or reputation to provide incentives are given in the text. For the details of sufficiency when monitoring is impossible, see Diamond (1989 The incentive of type BG's to select a, = b is increasing in cot. Any ott > ot't will lead future lenders to increase their estimate of the fraction of BG's in the pool of defaulters at t (compared to ot = ot'). If lenders lend to those who default at t, at a date t* > t the interest rate will be nonincreasing in cxt because monitored BG's are the only such borrowers that can select safe JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY projects. A value of ct, that exceeds xt' will increase rt. In addition, because it will raise the probability of being a type BG and reduce that of being a type B, given a default, either it will leave all future interest rates paid by those who default at t unchanged (which leaves the BGs' value of making optimal decisions from t + 1 to T unchanged) or it will decrease some of the rates and increase none (which increases the BGs' value of making optimal decisions from t + 1 to T). If some future rates are lower for ot > ct' (and the value of defaulting at t and making optimal decisions thereafter increases), then if BG's are indifferent for ct, they strictly prefer at = b for ott > ct'. By a symmetric argument, for ott < ct', rt is lower, and either future rates are weakly higher or (for sufficiently low att) there are no loans granted to those who default at t. Therefore, for at < cxt, either BG's remain indifferent between their two projects or they strictly prefer a, = g. Therefore, the amount by which BG's prefer at = b over at = g is weakly increasing in at. This implies that if ott E (0, 1) is self-fulfilling, then at = 0 is self-fulfilling. If BG's prefer at = g given the belief that tt = 0, then the belief ott = 0 is the only belief that satisfies the refinements used in the proof of lemma 1. Either the belief is the only sequentially rational belief or there exists a best response to some ot' E [0, 1] such that BG's are indifferent between at = b and at = g. The second case implies that any ott that implies BG weak preference for at = b implies B strict preference for risky projects. If Ott = 0, then all defaults come from B's, and lenders cut off credit to those who default. The Banks-Sobel (1986) divinity refinement and the related arguments discussed in the proof of lemma 1 allow only the offequilibrium belief at = g if it is self-fulfilling; this implies that a default indicates that a borrower's type is B. Only if this belief is not self-fulfilling do lenders expect a, = b and assign positive probability to defaults coming from type BG's in a period. Our previous result-if Ott E (0, 1) were selffulfilling, then at = 0 is self-fulfilling-implies that if ott = 0 is not selffulfilling, then ctt = 1 is the only self-fulfilling value.
The pool of borrowers that default at t when ott = 1 contains the same relative proportions of types B and BG as the group that had never defaulted up to t, and no type G's. Given the pool of borrowers with a track record of zero defaults, if ott = 0 is not self-fulfilling with or without monitoring at t (i.e., ot = 1 is the smallest self-fulfilling value of ott), then ott+ I = 1 is also the smallest self-fulfilling value for the pool of defaulters (the original pool with the type G's removed), with or without monitoring at t + 1. The defaulters would face higher face values rt at all future dates because of the lower probability of repayment, implying lower V,+ . Therefore, if the smallest self-fulfilling tt = 1, credit is cut off on a default because then a loan to a defaulter would lead any BG's in the group to select at = b, and all such borrowers would select the negative net present value project implied by at = b.
If monitoring that provides incentives would be profitable at t, then if ct = 0 is self-fulfilling for some monitoring decision, zero will be the equilibrium value of ott. Therefore, the previous paragraph's results imply that if incentive monitoring would be profitable, then credit is cut off on the first default.
If monitoring is needed, incentive monitoring is unprofitable, but monitoring would provide incentives if used at t, then loans will be made to those who default at t. This occurs only when monitoring is needed at t, so Ott = 0 without monitoring is not self-fulfilling. The conditions for monitoring to be needed or to provide incentives can therefore be computed correctly assuming that credit is cut off on the first default because this assumption about credit cutoff will be false only when the condition that monitoring is unprofitable is the binding constraint. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4
The condition for monitoring not to work when needed is A' rf => I' < r or At 2 It + (4 -rf). Using It-rf = C/ (1 -rTfBt) 
